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Gillian Brock’s Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account is an important contribution to 
contemporary discussions of global justice. The book marketer’s clichés are apt: it 
should be read by all students and scholars of global justice and will interest both aca-
demics and the general reader. It merits this praise because of its many virtues as a 
piece of scholarly writing: it is clear, provides a good introduction to the literature and 
develops an original account of its subject. Its originality consists in Brock’s attention 
to both practical and theoretical issues that have been neglected by cosmopolitan 
theorists. She structures her account as a response to two kinds of skeptics about 
cosmopolitan theories of global justice: “nationalism” skeptics, who claim that cosmo-
politan approaches neglect or exclude goods specific to bounded political communi-
ties, and “feasibility” skeptics, who claim that cosmopolitanism is unworkable in prac-
tice, whether because of difficulties in motivating adherence to cosmopolitan norms or 
because of the difficulty of realizing a cosmopolitan global order, including the diffi-
culty of making the transition to a more just global order.  Cosmopolitan responses to 
the former sort of skeptic abound, but the second sort of skepticism –which is a staple 
of cosmopolitanism’s critics– has received only the most cursory attention from pro-
ponents of cosmopolitanism and is often the weakest part of their arguments. Brock, 
accordingly, devotes most of her attention to answering the feasibility skeptic and, to 
some extent and appropriately, subsumes her response to the nationalist skeptic under 
her response to the feasibility skeptic. Broadly, her response to the feasibility skeptic is 
to adopt a form of cosmopolitanism that she thinks offers the broadest moral and 
psychological appeal, and to push for institutions that avoid, in her view, overly strong 
demands on actually existing contemporary individuals. Despite the many merits of 
her account, I argue that in doing so Brock adopts an overly minimalist conception of 
equality and democracy and explore some ways in which this minimalism affects her 
practical recommendations. 
 Brock’s theory involves a re-conception of Rawls’s original position, on a cos-
mopolitan basis. The parties to Brock’s original position are “randomly selected” dele-
gates to a conference that is to decide on «a fair framework for interactions and rela-
tions among the world’s inhabitants» (Brock, 2009, p. 48-49. All unattributed 
references hereafter are to Brock, 2009). The parties are under a familiar Rawlsian veil 
of ignorance about their allegiances and condition, as well as being unaware of the 
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distributions and demographics of particular communities (p. 49). Brock’s parties 
know that there are such communities, however, although these communities may 
“overlap”, have vague borders or be variously constituted, and the parties are familiar 
with the basic facts of human history (in particular historical and contemporary threats 
to human well being), economics and psychology. Such understanding of psychology 
should, if Brock is correct about the psychological evidence for the appeal and stability 
of her account, predispose the parties to endorse Brock’s principles. Under these con-
ditions, she argues that they will not choose a global difference principle, as a number 
of cosmopolitan theorists argue, but a principle that provides everyone with opportun-
ities to live a «minimally decent life» (p. 50). This account of the minimally decent life 
operates as a “floor”, below which no one should be allowed to fall, a floor unders-
tood in terms of individuals’ basic needs being met, certain “basic liberties” being pro-
tected and institutions that express the «fair terms of cooperation in joint undertakings 
and practices» –including fair distributions that result from them– and that promote 
this minimally decent life for all (p. 52-53). Further, Brock understands needs in the 
robust sense of Doyal and Gough, as «universalizable preconditions that enable non-
impaired participation in any form of life» (Doyal and Gough, 1991, cited Brock, 2009, 
p. 64). These needs include «physical and psychological health», «security», «under-
standing» of one’s options, «autonomy», and «decent social relations with at least some 
others» (p. 66-67). Armed with this complex understanding of the floor below which 
any life would not be minimally decent, Brock appeals to the experimental results of 
Frohlich and Oppenheimer, who claim to have modeled the veil of ignorance in their 
psychological experiments and to have shown that a floor principle –like Brock’s ex-
cept that it is only expressed in terms of a floor income which otherwise maximizes 
the highest average income– would be chosen over the difference principle by 78% of 
respondents after due deliberation (p. 55-56). Brock emphasizes their further claim 
that support for a floor principle that maximizes average income is found in a variety 
of cultural communities and is stable: individuals who have to live under institutions 
informed by such a principle are more likely to endorse the principle afterwards (p. 57). 
 There are a number of objections that might be made against Brock’s under-
standing of equality. Even if people do converge on such a principle, we might ques-
tion whether the notion of equality embodied in it conforms to our moral intuitions, 
especially if we consider how it operates in actual situations. One concern relates to 
the role that agency plays in Brock’s conception. Although Brock sees her develop-
ment of a robust conception of agency as crucial to her account, the details seem to 
permit a less than robust role for individual agency in practice. First, and unlike Rawls, 
there is no priority rule that favours liberty.2 Although there is a separate justification, 
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in Brock’s original position, for the basic liberties of freedom from «extreme coercion 
(such as slavery), freedom from torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, freedom from 
arbitrary interference and attack, and freedom from discrimination» (p. 152) and the 
liberties of free expression, association and some sort of participation that derive from 
these (p. 159), there is no fundamental obstacle to trading off these liberties against 
other components of the minimally decent life. This is true whether these basic liber-
ties are considered to be independent of needs or in terms of the basic need for au-
tonomy. While Brock’s floor principle may operate to block the worst forms of un-
freedom, like slavery, in that no one should be allowed to fall to that level of 
unfreedom, it gives little guidance regarding states of affairs and global institutions in 
which individuals have this minimum level met. Given that these liberties can be li-
mited by other liberties and by potential harms they may cause (p. 153), the way is 
open for societies inclined to limit liberty to do so in the name of suppressing license 
or preventing harm. Further, at the level of cases at the margin of minimal decency or 
even below the floor of a minimally decent life in non-ideal theory and in the non-
ideal transition to Brock’s just global order, Brock’s theory may license significant 
trade-offs which a strict priority rule would block. In a world that features many au-
thoritarian societies –some traditional, some not– arguments for such trade-offs will 
not be wanting. 
  Part of this problem lies with the notion of a floor principle itself. In this re-
gard, it is instructive to compare Brock’s account with Amartya Sen’s use of capabili-
ties as the measure of equality. Brock argues that her needs-based account is ‘closely 
related’ to the capabilities approach (p. 71). This may be true, if the capabilities ap-
proach is understood in terms of Martha Nussbaum’s list of capabilities, but is ques-
tionable if Sen’s more sophisticated account is considered. Nussbaum’s list does seem 
to be tied to needs, whereas Sen emphasizes the informational aspect of capability 
theory –and hence its flexibility (See Sen, The Idea of Justice, chapter 11)– but also its 
role as a conception of equality. Although Sen is unwilling to provide an authoritative 
list of capabilities, let alone their priority relations, he is clear that such hierarchies of 
priority can be established, at least as far as individual (and social) choice of capability 
sets is concerned. Both Sen’s famous results concerning the relationship between de-
mocracy and famine and his insistence that “development as freedom” is based on a 
universal appreciation of democracy suggest some of the priority relations that he is 
prepared to endorse. Indeed, he builds a certain ideal of democratic participation into 
the work of capabilities themselves, under the ‘process aspect’ of capabilities. Further, 
Sen developed capability theory as a non-minimalist theory of equality. In his classic 
lecture, Equality of What, (Sen, 1979) Sen explicitly argues that capabilities serve as a 
better metric of equality than rival conceptions because they better identify the inequa-
lities that count and how they should be remedied. One of Sen’s examples is a disabled 
person who requires more resources to be free to achieve equal functionings with able 
persons, not a minimally decent life (Sen, 1979, p. 218). Sen’s view culminates in the 
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theory of justice that animates his Idea of Justice: justice consists in comparative im-
provements in equality –and the remedy of injustice– not in the attainment of a mini-
mally decent life for all persons.(Sen, 2009, chapter 4) Unlike Brock’s floor theory, 
Sen’s theory of justice requires the perpetual realization of more equal distributions, 
even above any particular floor provision of a minimally decent life to all. 
 The failure to include a priority rule informs some of Brock’s practical recom-
mendations. Some of Brock’s discussions, like her emphasis on reforms of global taxa-
tion or of the global economic order, are important contributions to the potential rea-
lization of a more just world, but some of her recommendations suffer from her 
failure to give sufficient priority to liberty and from her straitened understanding of 
democratic agency. I consider her account of responsive democracy first. When consi-
dering the prospects for cosmopolitan democracy, Brock argues, following Weinstock, 
that a form of ‘responsive democracy’ rather than a more participatory conception of 
democracy is most suited to the global order (p. 105). Although Brock initially presents 
it as a ‘supplement’ to a participatory model, responsive democracy soon becomes a 
rival to participatory conceptions (p. 106). Participatory conceptions emphasize indi-
vidual agency and expression, whereas responsive democracy is oriented to responding 
to people’s interests and better securing them (p. 105-106). Brock argues that respon-
sive democracy better addresses cases of collective action problems, cases where af-
fected people cannot participate –like future generations– and cases in which expert 
knowledge is required to secure people’s interests (p. 106). Following Weinstock, she 
envisages many of these cases being dealt with by delegated authorities, that may or 
may not have direct lines of accountability to the actually existing  people whose inter-
ests are being secured. A similar understanding of «tracking people’s interests», rather 
than letting the people express those interests, can be found in her use of Philip Pet-
tit’s understanding of «non-domination» (p. 314). 
Perhaps the worries we might have about “responsive democracy” could be al-
layed by Brock’s use of Elizabeth Anderson’s “democratic equality”, where  strict ega-
litarianism of access to certain goods regardless of one’s motivation or character is 
replaced by a concern that all individuals are guaranteed «effective access to levels of 
functioning sufficient to stand as an equal in society» (Anderson, 1999, p. 318-319, 
cited in Brock, 2009, p. 303). Anderson’s “democratic equality” combines a participa-
tory and democratic understanding of equality with a toleration of potential deviations 
from strict equality that is similar to Brock’s floor principle.3 But it could also reveal a 
deep tension in Brock’s understanding of democracy: responsive democracies –with 
their expert panels, robustly independent judiciaries, auditors, “commissions of en-
quiry”, etc.– are vulnerable to capture by elites, especially privileged possessors of 
greater education and capital. While counter-majoritarian institutions like bills and 
                                                            
3 Note that Anderson’s use of Sen’s capabilities does not include Sen’s emphasis on egalitarianism, even though it 
does share his view that comparative improvements in justice should focus on ending oppression. See Anderson, 
1999, p. 75-76. 
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covenants of rights and independent judiciaries are required for liberal democracy at 
both the national and global level, Brock’s enthusiasm for delegated institutions cer-
tainly skews her conception of democracy away from Anderson’s more participatory 
understanding. I think that the dismal history of development interventions by experts 
who were hoping to secure people’s interests, but were unaccountable to those people, 
is a cautionary tale that shows the dangers of a responsive conception of democracy. 
Indeed, the development interventions –concrete attempts to meet individuals’ basic 
needs– that are the principal mode by which states have attempted to discharge their 
global obligations are curiously absent from Brock’s account. After a long and hard 
learning process, development practitioners are increasingly seeing not just consulta-
tion of, but participation with beneficiaries in development projects as crucial to their 
sustainability, long term stability and success. 
 The other area where Brock’s practical recommendations are undermined by 
her failure to include a priority rule or to sufficiently acknowledge individual agency is 
immigration. Brock notes Joseph Carens’s use of Rawls’s priority rule in his classic 
article advocating open borders (Carens, 1987). Carens argues that, in a global original 
position, the parties would choose a robust right to migrate which, like other rights 
subsumed under Rawls’s liberty principle, have lexical priority over considerations of 
distribution (Carens, 1987, p. 258). As I have noted above, Brock, like Rawls, is pre-
pared to curtail liberties both for the sake of other liberties, but, unlike Rawls, is pre-
pared to curtail liberties because of harms they might cause, including bad social and 
distributional consequences for the world’s worst off. As Darrel Moellendorf has 
noted, this is how Brock squares her claim that “freedom of movement” would be 
chosen in her original position with her support of relatively restrictive immigration 
policies.4 This is crucial to Brock’s discussion of immigration, since she uses a remark-
ably thorough account of the “brain drain” of healthcare workers from poor countries 
to wealthy ones to stand for the problems of immigration as a whole. She also has a 
long critique of remittances as promoters of global justice, also because of their bad 
consequences for sending communities and the willingness to work of receivers of 
remittances (p. 207). Considering the consequences for both the receiving country, the 
migrants themselves and the country of origin, she concludes that the harmful conse-
quences for poor individuals’ health care and the distorting effects of remittances in 
the country of origin mean that the migration of individuals from poor countries to 
wealthy ones is not an appropriate engine of global justice.  
Brock argues for various “win win” solutions, in which all parties benefit. 
Some of these are well worth exploring, especially programmes that compensate poor 
countries for the costs of training health care providers who then migrate to wealthy 
countries, including mandatory periods of return to their country of origin.(p. 208-209) 
Such programmes can be reconciled with a robust right to migrate, since such highly-
                                                            
4 Moellendorf cites Brock, 2009, p. 50. See Moellendorf, 2010, p. 266. 
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skilled migrants have some obligations of reciprocity to their fellow citizens who paid 
for their education and highly-skilled migrants can be presumed to have availed of this 
education voluntarily. Some of Brock’s other recommendations, however, cannot be 
reconciled with a basic right to free movement, even within one country. Her sugges-
tion that immigrants from overpopulated countries be required to live in underdeve-
loped parts of wealthy countries (p. 209-210) subjects immigrants to unfair coercion, 
restricts their freedom of movement compared to citizens in a discriminatory way and 
makes them a tool of the wealthy country’s economic policy. Much of the world’s mi-
gration is internal to states, and the level of coercion used in China in the past to con-
trol internal migration shows the importance of the basic liberty of free internal 
movement (Lambert and Chan, 1999, p. 82-83). Worse still is Brock’s enthusiasm for 
«guest worker programmes, the admission of migrants to work for temporary periods, 
with the time limit of their stay set by the usual point where remittances tend to de-
crease (p. 210-211). Not only do all actual guest worker programmes involve high le-
vels of coercion and surveillance even where they operate properly, in most cases they 
are seriously under-regulated, exposing migrant workers to extreme levels of coercion. 
Beyond these normative concerns about the use of migrants for economic develop-
ment, there are a number of parts of Brock’s account of migration that might be chal-
lenged on empirical grounds. For example, the use of highly skilled health care work-
ers as emblematic of international migration is problematic. Migration is a complex 
phenomenon, especially when considered in relation to poverty, and includes migra-
tion internal to one country, including internal displacement, as well as international 
migration. In a number of countries, migrants are drawn from the very poor, even if 
people with no assets whatsoever are somewhat less likely to migrate.5 We might agree 
with Brock when she argues that «increasing immigration (in isolation)» does not nec-
essarily constitute progress in global distributive justice, but a less restrictive immigration 
policy may represent more just treatment of individual would be migrants, particularly 
when we consider them as agents. 
 Brock’s recommendations surrounding immigration again show the dangers of 
her lack of a priority rule and insufficient consideration of immigrants’ agency. If the 
representatives to Brock’s conference know that there are distinct political communi-
ties, some of which have coercively enforced borders, they have good reason to 
choose a right to migrate, as Carens conceives it, as a basic liberty. They also, for the 
reasons involving trade-offs I have urged above, have reason to give their basic liber-
ties priority. Even accepting the facts about migration contained in Brock’s account 
                                                            
5 This is true of Ethiopia, for example. See Black, Hilker and Pooley, 2004, p. 12. See also Caponi, 2006, who notes 
that migration from Mexico in relation to level of education attained takes the form of a ‘U-shaped’ curve. In other 
words, the individuals most likely to migrate are those with the least and the highest level of education. Given the 
inequalities of access to education in Mexico, those with the least education vastly outnumber those with the most. 
Although Caponi finds that Mexican immigrants to the United States of America are somewhat better educated 
than those who stayed home, this does not mean that they are well educated. 
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and even in the absence of a priority rule, Brock’s representatives will still want a set of 
international institutions that allow considerable freedom of migration to those who 
are willing to engage in it. If migrants tend to be more skilled and have more assets 
than the worst off, as Brock claims, then they will be even more likely to choose 
Brock’s floor principle, involving as it does global institutions –including institutions 
that regulate migration– that raise average well-being. In a world in which everyone 
has the bases for a minimally decent life, whether through development interventions 
or free trade, there will still be migration pressure, since Brock’s theory allows for sig-
nificant inequalities between the well-being of individuals and of the populations of 
different political communities.6 It seems most likely that, in such a world, more open 
migration policies would lead to higher average well-being for residents of the receiv-
ing country and for the migrants themselves, and the people of the sending country 
would have their well-being protected by Brock’s floor principle. 
 In our imperfect, non-ideal world –and again, by Brock’s own lights– many 
would be immigrants are below the level of the minimally decent life, whether in terms 
of meeting their basic needs, enjoying basic liberties or being able to stand as equals in 
their society. In the transition to a more just order, more open migration policies 
might allow such individuals to achieve Brock’s minimally decent lives. They will not 
be able to do this, however, if their agency is not taken into account. One problem 
with most theories of migration is that they tend to view migrants as tools for the en-
hancement of the well-being of others, whether as bringing skills needed in the receiv-
ing country, increasing economic growth through their demand or promoting devel-
opment through the remittances they send back to the sending country.7 Brock’s 
overall account of immigration and her specific recommendations for the use of mi-
grants as guest workers and factors of regional economic development make migrant 
individuals tools of the cause of distributive justice. The cost of such a strategy is the 
migrant individual’s agency and prospects for democratic participation. Rather than 
being given the freedom to achieve their basic needs as a person, migrant individuals 
are admitted on the basis of whether they assist overall well-being and only on this 
basis. Guest worker programmes are the ultimate example of this: migrants are admit-
ted only so long as they benefit the host country (and in Brock’s account, the sending 
country). Restrictions on their stay and on their access to permanent residency and 
citizenship prevent them from availing of the basic democratic rights of host country 
citizens, including union membership, access to politicians, social supports and the 
enforcement of health and safety legislation.8 As Max Frisch said of the most noto-
rious long term guest worker programmes, those of postwar Germany, «We wanted 
workers; we got people» (Cited in Shanfield, no date).  These democratic disadvantages 
particularly characterize the undocumented migrants engendered by coercive immigra-
                                                            
6 For the impossibility of reducing migration pressure through development or trade, see Cohen, 2006, chapter 5. 
7 For this point, see Little, 1992, p. 50. 
8 I have argued this at greater length, with J.M. Mancini, in Mancini and Finlay, 2008. 
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tion regimes. In effect, under Brock’s scheme, the majority of poor migrants face 
coercion, restrictions on their movement and denial of democratic participation be-
cause they have tried to migrate despite not being the very worst off in the sending 
country. Meanwhile, the truly worst off are characterized as extremely passive and 
unable or unwilling to alter their condition. They are seen as people who must have 
everything done for them. Even if the consequences of our actually existing regime of 
migration and remittances are as negative as Brock describes, this does not mean that a 
reformed approach to migration and remittances that promotes both freedom of 
movement and the well-being of the very worst off is not possible. Indeed, as Brock 
notes, such a reformed approach has already been explored in Mexico, where «roads 
and schools» and other «public works» have been built by the state providing matching 
funds to remittance money (p. 206). Such programmes evade the bad consequences –e.g. 
the tendency to spend remittance money on consumption– that Brock identifies (p. 
205). If reforms of the recruitment of health care professionals from the developing 
world are possible, then so are reforms of remittances. 
 Despite all these concerns with both the theoretical and practical aspects of 
Brock’s argument, it is clear that the guaranteeing of access to Brock’s minimally de-
cent life on the part of all the world’s people would be a momentous improvement in 
the lives of the majority of human beings. Many of her practical recommendations, 
which I have not discussed in this response, should be heeded by anyone interested in 
achieving greater global justice. I have tried to identify both the theoretical concerns 
we might have about Brock’s account and some places where the differences between 
her account and a more robust egalitarianism may lead to different results. These dif-
ferences do not vitiate, however, the promise of Brock’s title. She has given us an im-
portant account of global justice, and a cosmopolitan one. 
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